Cryptographic applications of lattices include both cyptanalysis and the design of (provably secure) cryptographic functions. Cryptanalysis applications are usually based on lattice reduction techniques. The name "lattice based cryptography" typically refers to the second kind of applications: using lattices as a source of computational hardness in the construction of cryptographic functions which are at least as hard to break as solving some underlying lattice problem.
radius problem within g ≈ n 2.5 , and Regev's cryptosystem [7] based on the inapproximability of uSVP within g ≈ n 1.5 . All these results about lattice based cryptography are mostly interesting from a theoretical viewpoint, as they are the only known cryptographic constructions that can be proved secure based on a worst case complexity assumption (see the entry computational complexity for further discussion on complexity assumptions). In practice, most lattice based cryptographic functions need extremely large keys in order to avoid known cryptanalytic attacks. The reason is that the storage typically required by an n-dimensional lattice grows at least as the square of the security parameter n. So, even if the security parameter is set to a few hundreds, the resulting key can easily exceeds hundreds of thousands of bits. However, practical lattice based crytographic constructions may be possible. The main practical lattice based cryptosystem is NTRU, proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman in 1996 [3] . NTRU achieves small key size using a special class of lattices (convolutional modular lattices) that allow for very compact representation. Unfortunately, NTRU is not known to be provably secure based on any worst case complexity assumptions, so the security of this system relies on traditional cryptanalytic methods.
Lattice based cryptography is still a young and very active research area, and work is being done toward the design of cryptosystems that are both very efficient, and have provable security guarantees similar to Ajtai's original construction. A recent result pointing in this direction, is the discovery by Micciancio [4] that certain generalized compact knapsacks are at least as hard to break as solving the worst case instance of some lattice problems. These compact knapsacks achieve very small key size using a class of lattices different, but related to those used by NTRU. However, they do not provide an encryption scheme because they lack the trapdoor (secret key) necessary for decryption. Other recent results that may lead to provably secure practical constructions are the lattice based identification schemes of Micciancio and Vadhan [6] , where the same lattice can be shared by all users, and the public key consists of a single vector (with secret key given by the lattice point closest to the public vector).
For a detailed study of lattice based cryptographic functions with provable security properties and an expository overview of the main lattice based cryptosystems, the reader is referred to [5] . See also lattice reduction for information about the use of lattices in cryptanalysis.
